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TRANSLATION  AS  ARGUMENT
JUSTICE  AS  TRANSLATION:  AN  ESSAY  IN  CULTURAL  AND  LEGAL
CRITICISM,  By  James  Boyd White.*  Chicago: The  University  of
Chicago Press  1990.  Pp. 313.  $29.95
MARK  V. TUSHNET**
James  Boyd  White  has  pulled  off a  major  accomplishment:  he
made  me  want to write a defense  of Richard  Posner in the most
occluded  and  bureaucratic  prose  possible.'  My  desire  results  in
part from some obvious defects in White's arguments, particularly
with respect to what he defines  as "economics"  and  "philosophy,"
and  in  more  substantial  part  from  the  manner  in  which  White
presents  his  arguments.  I should  say  at the outset, so that  what
follows may be discounted appropriately, that I respond to White's
manner  of  presentation  as  most  people  respond  to  fingernails
raking  across  a  blackboard.2 In Justsce as Translatwn, 3  I  found
one  extremely  striking  essay,  "Translation,  Interpretation,  and
Law,"  a few  provocative  close  readings  of  some  cases  and  legal
texts, and a lot of fog. In this Review,  I hope to work toward  an
explanation  of how,  in light  of  my reaction-which  I believe  to
*  L. Hart Wright Professor  of Law  & English, Umversity  of Michigan.
**  Professor  of Law, Georgetown  Umversity  Law Center. B.A., Harvard  College, 1967;
J.D.,  Harvard  Law  School,  1971; M.A.,  Yale Umversity,  1971.
1. I resist the  former temptation,  but see  snfra text accompanying  notes  82-109,  and
conclude  reluctantly  that I lack  the talent to succumb  to the latter. I put it that way to
emphasize  that, once  one sees  the  use  of bureaucratic  prose  as a  choice  which  stylists
can  select,  one's  inability  to make that  choice becomes  a  defect  in one's  literary  talent.
From  this point  of view,  which  may  be a  postmodermst  one  and  therefore  uncongemal
to White, literary talent includes  the ability to switch  freely  from  one style to another.
See,  e.g.,  A.  HUTCHINSON,  DWELLING  ON  THE  THRESHOLD:  CRITICAL  ESSAYS  ON  MODERN
LEGAL  THOUGHT  (1988).  In  contrast,  White  believes  that  using  the  bureaucratic  style
shows a  character defect, at least when an author does not deliberately  choose that style
over others. Whether  he believes  that anyone  can make  such  a  choice is  unclear.
2.  I must note at the  outset that, based on White's influence,  many people  regard  him
as an inspiring  teacher,  and that my reaction  perhaps  should be  discounted as resulting
from  my general  cussedness.
3.  J.  WHITE,  JUSTICE  AS  TRANSLATION:  AN  ESSAY  IN  CULTURAL  AND  LEGAL  CRITICISM
(1990).
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be justified-to  these  essays,  White  could  have  become  a  major
figure  in  the  law  and  literature  subdiscipline.4  I  do  so  by  at-
tempting, to adapt one of White's phrases, to construct the reader
White imagines  for his work.5
White's  essays articulate  two related themes. The first, emerg-
ing most  clearly  from  some  of  his  readings  of  Supreme  Court
opinions, is that all too often the Court speaks  in an authoritarian
voice. White argues, for example, that Justice Felix Frankfurter's
defense  of  the  proposition  that  police  procedures  "shock  the
conscience" 6  ultimately  rests  on  the  authoritarian  claim  that
judges  like  Frankfurter  are  people  whose  characters  are  such
that the citizenry  ought  to defer  to their  judgments.7 Similarly,
Chief Justice  Taft's opinion in Olmstead v.  United States8 "appeals
to our desires  for  simplicity,  for authority  of a  certain  kind, and
for  a boss  who will tell us what things mean and how they are."9
The  second  theme  is that society  ought to  develop  a  capacity
to see law as translation; that is, as  an effort to articulate  a way
of  being  open  to  alternative  meanings  while  recognizing  that
what  judges  and lawyers  create  inevitably  operates  in a domain
"in  between"  the  claims  of  authority,  precedent,  social  policy,
and the like:  "There is no single appropriate response to the text
of  another, nor  even  a finite  appropriate  set  of responses;  what
is  called  for is  a kind  of imaginative  self-assertion  in relation  to
another."'1 0  The  good translator  has  "an  excellence  of  mind  and
character  . . . to which  we  can  aspire:  an  attempt to be  oneself
in relation to an always imperfectly  known and imperfectly  know-
able  other who  is  entitled  to a respect  equal to our  own.""
Presented in this manner, the choice seems clear. Authoritarian
voices are  bad; imaginative self-assertion  respectful  of the voices
of others  is  good. Yet, this sort of opposition  has a certain  "new
age"-ish mushiness that provokes  some cranky observations. First,
4.  The  obvious  counter to the  thrust  of  this Review  is  that my  reaction  to the book
can  most  charitably  be  called  idiosyncratic,  and  that  the explanation  for  White's  promi-
nence  is,  contrary  to  my  view,  that his  work  is  actually  extremely  good  (and that,  in
legal  academia,  people  who  write  extremely  good  works  become  prominent).  The  only
answer  possible  to such a  counter  is the  Review  itself.
5.  "Who  . . . is  the  Ideal  Reader  defined  by  the  Constitution  or  by  this  statute  or
contract?"  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3, at  101.
6.  Rochin  v. California,  342  U.S.  165, 172  (1952).
7.  See J.  WHITE,  supra note 3,  at  107-09.
8.  277  U.S.  438 (1928).
9.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3,  at  148.
10.  Id.  at  256.
11.  Id.  at  258.
[Vol.  32:105TRANSLATION  AS  ARGUMENT
White trades on implicit 2 images of African-Americans  and women
as  excluded  outsiders  whose  voices  need  to  be  heard. 3  His
formulations,  though,  seem  to  ask  "us"  to  be  open to  everyone.
Frankly, that strikes me as ridiculous. "We" may not have learned
much  about  right  and wrong  over the  course  of history,  but we
know  enough  to  realize  that  we  do  not have  to  be  open  to the
voices  of racists. 4 The  idea that we should be open to previously
excluded  voices,  in  contrast,  relies  on  a  substantive  theory  of
justice  regarding  the  impropriety  of  past  exclusion  of  certain
voices.  White's  approach  lacks substantive  content.15
Second,  read  closely,  White  himself is  not completely  open  to
alternative  voices.  He systematically  downplays  the claims  made
on behalf of "law-and-order,"'1 6 and, when he proffers  the voice  of
a police officer, he treats the officer  with an attitude  somewhere
in  between  indifference  and  contempt. 7  This  occurs  in  White's
discussion  of  United States v.  Robinson, 18  which  upheld  the  au-
thority  of a police officer to engage in a full body search incident
to  an  arrest,  even  though  a  full  search  was  unnecessary  to
discover  evidence  of the crime  for  which the arrest  occurred,  or
to  ensure  that  the  person  arrested  was  not  carrying  anything
that  he  or  she might  use  to harm  the arresting  officer.' 9  White
introduces  his discussion  of the case  by quoting the testimony  of
the  arresting officer:  "I just  searched  him.  I  didn't  think about
what I was looking for. I just searched  him."2 0 Later, White  says
that this  sort of statement  shows  that, in  the officer's  view,
12.  To the extent  that White places  slavery at the center of his discussion,  his imagery
is  explicit. See infra text accompanying  notes  39-71.
13.  J.  WHITE, supra  note 3,  at 11340.
14.  Institutional reasons may  exist for protecting the rights of racists to say what they
believe,  but the  metaphor  of  openness  on  which  White  relies  suggests  that we  should
always  be in  a  position  to  accept  what  others  say,  or  at least to reject  what  they  say
after respectful  consideration.
15.  In addition, though it may be inevitable in jurisprudence,  White's  approach  plainly
favors  those  who are  more, rather than  less, articulate.
16.  In discussing  Olmstead  v. United  States,  277  U.S.  438  (1928),  White  makes  "[o]ne
final  point"  that  "in  this  case  it  is  the  law-and-order  man  who  is  authoritarian  in  his
voice  and style, and  the defender  of individual rights who speaks  as an individual himself
and to  us as  individuals."  J. WHITE,  supra note  3,  at  157. After sketching  an alternative
opinion,  White  concludes  that  "it would be  hard to  [come  out on the law-and-order  side]
very persuasively."  Id. at  158.
17.  J. WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 187-88.
18.  414 U.S.  218 (1973).
19.  Id.
20.  J. WHITE,  supra  note 3,  at  187  (quoting Robinson, 414  U.S.  at  251  (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
1990]WILLIAM  AND MARY  LAW REVIEW
the  citizen  whose  rights  are  invaded  is  not  entitled  to  insist
that the  invasion  be limited  by  a  stated  justification.  Instead
of being regarded as a person, whose interests clash with those
of the  police, the  suspect is  here  told that  in some important
way he  belongs to  the police  and not to  himself.21
This  viewpoint,  to  White,  does  not  offer  "a  language  in  which
the opposing  sides  could  both  talk,  expressing  their  claims  and
defining their  disagreement.
'22
From  this  passage,  I  suggest  that White  is,  to put  it  mildly,
not sensitive  to what the arresting  officer actually  was  saying. I
suspect  that "I just searched  him"  means  something like  this:2
I  go  out there  every  day  and  run  into  a lot  of people  who
are  doing their best to  live decent  lives  in  a society  which  is
so indifferent  to  their troubles  that it allows  them  to  live  in
conditions  subjecting  them to serious  risks of death  and phys-
ical injury.  I  have  to  do  the  best I  can to  help  those  people
by  protecting  them  against  the  depredations  of  evildoers,  of
whom  there are  also many.  But, doing my job also puts me  in
serious  danger,  not  all  the  time but  often  and  unpredictably
enough  that  I  can  never  be  confident  that  any  discussion  I
have  with  anyone,  particularly  a  discussion  with  someone  I
have  arrested,  will  not  erupt  into  violence  at  any  moment.
That puts me  in  a  "mind  set" that is quite  hard to  live with;
normal people  just do not go  around  assuming that violence  is
liable  to  occur  around  them  at  every  moment.  To  be  able to
live  my  life  off  the  job  in  a  decent  way,  I  have  to  develop
some psychological  mechanisms  that let me  "bracket" the  job,
so that  I  can  put it,  and  the  ever-present  threat of violence,
aside when  I go  home.
That  is  not  easy  to  do,  but  one  mechanism  that  works
reasonably  well  is  to  develop  routines,  so that  I  do  not  have
to think about what  I am doing at every moment.  One routine
is  to  search  everyone  I  arrest,  not  because  I  would  actually
make  a  considered  judgment  in  every  case  that  I am  at risk
of violence  but because,  unless  I  develop  that  routine,  I  will
not be  able  to turn the job  off at  night when  I go home. The
courtroom  and  the  streets  are  so  far  apart  that  it  would  be
demeaning for me to try to  lay  all this  out when  some lawyer
asks me a silly question, so I answer by saying, "I just searched
21.  Id. at  195.
22. Id. at  196.
23.  As should  be clear, I  am  improvising  in this passage  and  omit the profanities  that
surely  would  be  part of the officer's  response.
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him.  I  didn't  think  about  what  I  was  looking  for."  Then,  to
compound  the  insult,  some  law  professor  criticizes  me  for
treating Robinson  as  if I  owned  him! That professor  ought  to
talk to the good  people  on the streets and see what they think
about  my  trying to  get  drug dealers  out of their  lives  before
he tells  me that  nonsense.  Or,  he  should  not  send  me  out  on
the  streets  to try  to  help  the  good  people  lead  decent  lives
without backing  me  up in some other  way.
At some  level,  I believe,  or hope,  that White  would  find  that
sort  of statement,  or a more  realistic  one  along  similar lines,  an
honest and acceptable presentation  of the law-and-order  position.
What  is  striking,  however,  is  that  nowhere  in  his  book  does
White  even  try to engage  in a  dialogue  with  people  of the  sort
I have  imagined  here.  This  absence  suggests  that White's  open-
ness is  only  partial, and  that his partiality  has  some,  dare I  call
it  political,  content. The first aspect  of White's imagined  reader,
thus, is  a political  one:  someone  who  is basically  sympathetic  to
the reforms  of constitutional  criminal procedure instituted by the
Warren  Court  and  basically  not  terribly  sensitive  to  the  real
problems  of maintaining  order  in a disorderly  society.
A  third  cranky  observation  about  White's  language  supports
this  suggestion.  Early  in  the  book,  White  offers  an  analysis  of
"academic  and  professional  discourse,' 24  asking  his  readers  to
imagine  themselves  as professors  in their  offices.  How,  he  asks,
do they  approach  the literature  of the  field?  He  writes,
If you  are at all like me you  do  so not with  eager anticipation
but with  a feeling  of guilty  dread  and  with  an expectation  of
frustration.  For  we  live  in  a  world  of  specialized  texts  and
discourses,  marked  by  a  kind  of thinness,  a  want  of  life  and
force  and  meaning.
2 5
He  continues,  "there  is  something  about  our  conception  of  pro-
fessionalism-it  may have  to do with the use of a false  image  of
science  as  a  model  of  thought  and  discourse-that  leads  us  to
speak  and  write  in  ways that  are  false  to the  character  of  our
own  intellectual  lives. '26 For  White,
24.  J. WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 8.
25.  Id.
26.  Id.  at  11.  For  a  discussion  of  White's  difficulties  with  science,  see  infra text
accompanying  notes  111-21.
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in literature  and in law  alike there  is often  a perceptible  want
of love  for the subject matter  .. . .The driving emotion often
seems  not  to  be  love but  a  desire  to  dissect,  to  dominate,  to
conquer,  both  the  past  and  one's  contemporary  peers.  The
erotics  of  this  kind  of  criticism  is  not  reciprocal  or  mutually
recognizing,  but  competitive  and dominating.2 7
This  and similar  passages  in  White's  work offer much  to think
about.  Most  obviously,  who  is  this  "we"  he  is  talking  about?  To
whom  is  the  "want  of  love  for  the  subject  matter"  perceptible
(an interestingly  passive  construction)?  White describes  a deeply
alienated  professional  academic  lawyer.  That  description  may
reflect  his  professional  experience,  but-I cannot  avoid  personal
testimony  here-it  is  not  my  professional  experience.  For  me,
reading law and the many legal commentaries  currently produced
is  truly  exciting,  and  I have  learned,  grown,  and  been  erotically
engaged  in the  sense  White  appears  to intend,  even  by  work  as
fundamentally  bad  as White's. 2 8
White  describes  professional  legal  writing as if it  were  limited
to  narrow,  purely  doctrinal  analyses  of  the  sort  that  occupied
almost  the entire  discipline  in  the  1950's.  But the  world  of legal
academics  is  not  like that  any more,  if it ever  was.  White treats
himself  "as  a  local informant  about  my own  language, '29 which is
fair  enough,  but  if  the  rest  of  "us"  are  to  take  his  cultural
criticism  seriously,  he should  give  us more  assurance  of his  good
sense  of the  culture  he  purports to be  criticizing.
I am reasonably  confident  that  White is  offering rather cogent
criticisms  of  a  segment  of  the  culture  of  the  legal  academy  of
the  1950's,  but  I  wonder  why  I  should  care  much  about  that
today.30  Also, when  he  gets as close  to cases  as  he  comes  in  this
discussion,  White  seems  wildly  off  the  mark.  The  first  part  of
the  book  includes  essays  on  what  White  offers  as contemporary
27.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3,  at 99.
28.  In  writing this  sentence  at  this  point  in  the  Review,  as  in  writing  the  Review  as
a  whole,  I am  aware  that  White  already  has  in  place  his  defense  to criticism-that  it  is
"not  reciprocal  or  mutually  recognizing,  but  competitive  and  dominating."  Id.  In  the
manner  of  passive-aggressive  behavior,  is  not  that  defense  itself  "not  reciprocal  or
mutually  recognizing"  in  that  it  discredits  from  the outset  claims,  such  as  mine,  that
White's  book  is  fundamentally  bad?  Id.
29.  Id.  at  26.
30.  1 have  to  say  that, after  reading  White's  description  of  the alienated  intellectuals
that constitute the culture he  criticizes,  I could not shake the image of male  law professors
vho  believe  that  they  must  wear  a  tie when  they  teach-  not  that  wearing  a  tie  while
;eaching  is  wrong, only  that  it ought to be  a choice  rather  than  a cultural  imperative.
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him.  I  didn't  think  about  what  I  was  looking  for."  Then,  to
compound  the  insult,  some  law  professor  criticizes  me  for
treating Robinson  as  if  I  owned  him! That  professor  ought  to
talk to the good  people  on the streets  and see what they  think
about  my trying  to get  drug  dealers  out  of their  lives  before
he  tells  me  that  nonsense.  Or,  he  should  not  send  me  out  on
the  streets  to  try  to  help  the  good  people  lead  decent  lives
without backing  me  up in  some  other way.
At  some  level,  I  believe,  or  hope, that  White  would  find  that
sort of statement,  or  a more  realistic  one  along  similar  lines,  an
honest  and acceptable  presentation  of the law-and-order  position.
What  is  striking,  however,  is  that  nowhere  in  his  book  does
White  even  try  to  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  people  of the  sort
I  have  imagined  here.  This  absence  suggests  that  White's  open-
ness  is  only  partial,  and that  his  partiality  has  some,  dare  I  call
it political,  content.  The  first aspect  of White's  imagined  reader,
thus, is  a  political  one:  someone  who  is  basically  sympathetic  to
the reforms of constitutional  criminal procedure  instituted by  the
Warren  Court  and  basically  not  terribly  sensitive  to  the  real
problems  of maintaining  order  in  a  disorderly  society.
A  third  cranky  observation  about  White's  language  supports
this  suggestion.  Early  in  the  book,  White  offers  an  analysis  of
"academic  and  professional  discourse,' 24  asking  his  readers  to
imagine  themselves  as  professors  in their  offices.  How,  he asks,
do they  approach  the literature  of the field?  He  writes,
If  you are  at all like  me you  do  so not with  eager  anticipation
but  with  a  feeling  of  guilty  dread  and  with  an expectation  of
frustration.  For  we  live  in  a  world  of  specialized  texts  and
discourses,  marked  by  a  kind  of  thinness,  a  want  of  life  and
force  and  meaning.
2
He  continues,  "there  is  something  about  our  conception  of  pro-
fessionalism - it may  have to  do  with the use  of  a  false  image  of
science  as  a  model  of  thought  and  discourse - that  leads  us  to
speak  and  write  in  ways  that  are  false  to  the  character  of  our
own intellectual  lives. '2 6  For White,
24.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3,  at  8.
25.  Id.
26.  Id.  at  11.  For  a  discussion  of  White's  difficulties  with  science,  see  infra text
accompanying  notes  111-21.
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the  most part  do  I  cite  particular  writers  on  particular  points"
because  White's  "concern  is  with  structure  and tendency  rather
than  detail."33 But, for  a reader  of texts,  I think  the distinction
between structure/tendency  and detail is meaningless.34 I  suspect
the  problem  is that,  somewhere  deep  down,  White  knows  that
his  reflections  on  law-and-economics  and  philosophy  would  not
survive  a  close  reading  of actual texts, at least  if, as a  cultural
critic  must  allow,  the selection  of texts were  subjected  to  some
test of representativeness.  It  may  not be that for every Richard
Posner or Ronald Dworkin there  is an Amartya Sen or a Stanley
Cavell,  but  enough  of the  latter  exist  to make  White's  cultural
criticism  quite  unpersuasive.
(In the prior sentence,  I considered  including a footnote  saying
that White  acknowledges  the  existence  of  Sen35  and  CavellP6  in
passing, while suggesting that "real" economists and philosophers
were  people  like  Posner  and  Dworkin-though  he  does  not use
their  names  in his  text. Doing  that,  though,  would  have  repro-
duced  the  privileging  of  text over  footnotes  which  is  the  point
this paragraph  identifies.) 3 7
If White  is  not truly  open  to  a fairly  large  number  of  voices,
how  can  he  present  himself  as  the  apostle  of  openness?  His
criticism  of authoritarianism  offers  a third  aspect  of  the reader
he imagines:  a tender-minded  liberal  who finds himself or herself
uncomfortable  with the inroads that law-and-economics  has made
in  the  legal  academy.  White  makes  an  interesting,  and  on  one
level  quite  outrageous,  rhetorical  maneuver  which  bolsters  that
suspicion.  The  second  section  of  the  book  deals  with  judicial
opinions  and  consists,  after  an  introductory  chapter,  of readings
of opinions.38  The first reading deals with two opinions  discussing
the constitutional  aspects  of slavery. 9 This reading  allows  White
to show that he really is  on the right side, that he thinks slavery
was  a  bad thing. Although  this  is  not  hot  news,  it  immediately
33.  J.  WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 51.
34.  I  am  confident  that  White  could  have  made  many  of  his  points  more  effectively,
though without being able to attribute the defects he found to economics, through readings
of  the  opinions  and  articles  of  Judges  Posner  and  Easterbrook,  the  former  of  whom
routinely  generates  opinions  that read  like  entries  in  a  contest  for parodies  of the style
of Ernest  Hemingway.
35.  See J. WHITE,  supra  note 3,  at 78  (parenthetical reference  to Sen).
36.  See id. at 272-73  n.6  (approving  citation  to Cavell).
37.  I leave  it to the reader  to consider  the significance  of the parentheses  around  this
paragraph.
38.  J. WHITE,  supra note  3,  at  11340.
39.  Id. at  127.
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places the reader  on White's side, allowing White to claim there-
after to  continue  a  collaboration  instituted  in the  common  judg-
ment  about slavery.
But,  after  all,  there  is  something  rather  demeaning  about
making  a big deal about  the proposition  that slavery  was  a  bad
thing. I found this  particularly  annoying in White's  discussion  of
Dred Scott v.  Sandford,°  wherein  he  offers  an  interpretation  of
Chief Justice  Taney's  opinion that almost  necessarily  evokes  in
a  modern  reader  questions  that  arise  in  connection  with  the
abortion issue and then (willfully, it seems to me) fails to address
those issues. In contemporary political discourse, Dred  Scott func-
tions  as  an  analogue  to  the  abortion  decisions.  Critics  of  those
decisions  sometimes  argue that, just  as the Court  in Dred Scott
held  that  African-Americans  could  not  be  citizens  within  the
meaning  of the  Constitution,  so the Court  in Roe  v.  Wade4  held
that fetuses  were  not  people  in  the  constitutional  sense.42  One
passage  in White's  discussion  of Dred Scott speaks to this  argu-
ment, though not in a way that casts credit on White. The passage
takes  off from  the observation  that Taney  had  no "warrant  . ..
in constitutional  terms"4 3  to talk about race  at all:  "For nowhere
in  the  Constitution  is  race  mentioned,  nor  does  it  list  other
categories of human beings, some who can become citizens, others
who cannot.  . . ."44 White notes that Taney's language responded
to the defendant's  plea that African-Americans  could not become
citizens:
But the  normal  practice  when  a  party  makes  a  claim  cast  in
extra-legal  terms  is  either  to disregard  it or to  recast  it, as
far as possible, in legal terms. (Suppose, for example, that the
defendant  had  argued that  a  short  person  or  a  blind  person
could  not  become  a  citizen.  Would  the  Supreme  Court  have
accepted that  as its question?)45
The  answer White wants to his rhetorical  parenthetical  question
is  "No."  I  cannot  see,  however,  how White  can  resist the impli-
cations  of the  following  reformulation:  "Nowhere  in the  Consti-
tution  are  fetuses  mentioned.  Suppose  a  lawyer  argued  that  a
40.  60 U.S.  (19 How.)  393 (1857).
41.  410 U.S.  113  (1973).
42.  Id.  at  158.
43.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3,  at  127.
44.  Id
45. Id.
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fetus  was  a person.  Should the Supreme  Court accept that as its
question?"46  I  cannot  avoid  feeling  that  White  fails  to  address
this  question  because,  although  opposing  slavery  is  easy,  taking
a position  on  abortion  is  more  difficult  for some.
The  cheapness  of  White's  moral  stance  against  slavery  is
particularly  demeaning because the chapter's subtext is a polemic
against  the jurisprudence  of  original  intent  associated  with for-
mer Attorney General Edwin Meese.47 By demonstrating that the
jurisprudence  of original  intent led the Court to come out  on the
side  of  slavery  in  these  cases,  White  implies  that the  jurispru-
dence  of  original  intent  is  fundamentally  misconceived. 4  The
argument  misfires,  however,  because  White  invites  his readers
to  take  the  texts  of  cases  decided  in  1842  and  1857  as  contem-
porary  texts.  Accordingly,  he  criticizes  Justice  Joseph  Story's
opinion  in Prigg v. Pennsylvania 49:
[Story's]  way  of reading legal texts  is inconsistent  with the
fundamental  idea  of law  on  at  least  two  counts:  first,  as we
think of it, law is  a way of creating  a world that accommodates
opposing interests  and claims,  a world in which  distinct voices
can be heard....
Second,  Story's method  eliminates  the  aspirational  or ideal-
izing element that is essential to what we think of as law . . .5
Maybe  I am  too much of a  historian, but someone  writing  about
a jurisprudence  of original intention  ought to be sensitive  to the
possibility that people  in the past did not think of law as we  do
and that openness  to distinct  voices  means  attempting  to repro-
duce  the  mental  universe  in  which  they  operated  to  find  the
meaning  of things that seem  so odd  to us today.
I  can  elaborate  by  examining  White's  criticism  of  Story  in
somewhat  more  detail.  Prigg was  a  case  in  which  the  state
prosecuted  a  slave-catcher  for  kidnapping  a  woman  who  had
46.  In  this  example,  it  does  not  seem  significant  that antichoice  lawyers  argue  that
fetuses are persons whereas  proslavery lawyers  argued that African-Americans  could not
be citizens.  (Prochoice lawyers  argue that fetuses are not persons,  and antislavery  lawyers
argued that African-Americans  were, or  could be, citizens.)
47.  The  chapter  title  is  "'Original  Intention'  in  the  Slave  Cases."  Meese  is  not cited
anywhere  in  the  chapter  or  its  footnotes,  but  it is  inconceivable  that  White's  readers
would not understand  the target  of the criticism.
48.  J.  WHITE, supra note 3,  at 134-36.
49.  41 U.S.  (16  Pet.) 539  (1842).
50.  J.  WHITE, supra note  3,  at 121  (emphasis added).
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escaped  from  slavery  in  Maryland.51 The  slave-catcher  failed  to
comply  with the procedures  for establishing  ownership  specified
in  Pennsylvania  law.52 The  Supreme  Court  held that  the  Penn-
sylvania  statute  was  unconstitutional.0  White  begins  by  exam-
ining  the  language  of the  fugitive  slave  clause4  and  concludes
that  one  can  fairly  construe  the clause  as  authorizing  Congress
to  enact  a  statute  defining  procedures  for  identifying  fugitive
slaves,  as Congress had  done in the Fugitive Slave  Act of 1793.
55
Yet,  White  also  concludes  that  the  Act  did  not  preempt  state
legislation  consistent with its aim of properly identifying fugitive
slaves  and  their  owners.  Because  the  Pennsylvania  statute  har-
monized  with the  federal  Act, the  state  could  insist that  slave-
catchers  comply  with it.
5 6
White  contrasts  this  analysis,  which  "a modern  constitutional
lawyer  might generate,' 5 7 with the argument that Story actually
makes.  For  White,  Story  "short-circuit[s]"  this  sort  of  analysis
by adopting  a historical view  of the origins  of the fugitive  slave
clause.-9  As  Story  reads  the  history,  the  fugitive  slave  clause
was  an  essential  element  of  the  compromise  that  brought  the
Constitution  into being:  "Story pierces  the text for the intention
that  he  says  underlies  it  and  declares  that  this intention  is  its
meaning.  For  him  language  is  not  the  source  of  meaning,  nor
does it  give  it  shape;  meaning lies  in the wish  or  aim  or motive
of the author."59 As a result, Story adopts "an  impossible diction,"
which  transforms  the  Constitution's  term  "discharge"  so  as  to
"erase[  ]  the distinctions between 'interrupt,' 'limit,'  'delay,'  'post-
pone,'  and  'discharge.'  ,,60  The  source  of this  view,  according  to
White,  is  Story's interpretive  method  of "look[ing]  through  .. .
language  for the intention  that lies  behind  it."' 61
A number  of things  are  wrong with this  argument. First, and
least important, White's  criticism  of Story's interpretation  of the
term  "discharge"  seems  to  ignore  the  proposition  that  "it  is  a
51.  41  U.S.  (16  Pet.) at  543.
52.  Id.  at 608.
53.  Id.  at 625-26.
54.  J.  WHITE, supra note  3,  at 115.
55.  Id.  at 117.
56.  Id.
57. Id.
58.  Id.  at 117-22.
59.  Id.  at 118.
60.  Id.  at 119.
61.  Id.  at 120.
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constitution we  are  expounding. '62  People  engaged  in  ordinary
discourse  might  occasionally  want  to  distinguish  among  "dis-
charge,"  "interrupt,"  "delay,"  and  the  like.  As  John  Marshall
understood,  however,  the  language  of  the  Constitution  was  a
language  of  condensation  which  used  general  terms  to  express
authority  to deal  with  subjects  that, in  a more  refined  form  of
discourse,  people  might treat separately. 6 3 Story might well have
thought that the fugitive slave clause  was  exactly of this nature.
Second,  White  simply  ignores  the  fact that,  in the  conceptual
universe  in which Story operated, the modern distinction between
a  constitutional  provision  that  authorizes  Congress  to  adopt  a
statute that preempts  state  authority  and  a preemptive  statute
was  not  at  all  well-established.  In  Gibbons v.  Ogden, 6'  Marshall
found  "great  force"  in  the argument  that the  grant  of power  to
Congress  to regulate  interstate  commerce  in  itself  and  without
further  legislation  displaced  all state authority  to act  similarly. 65
Determining  whether  a  constitutional  provision  had  this  auto-
matic  preemptive  effect  required  an  examination  of  the  nature
of the power  at issue.  An  examination  of the intentions  of those
who placed the power in the Constitution is one way to determine
the nature of that power; such  an approach  is hardly  inconsistent
with  our notion  of law. If Congress's  power  to adopt  laws regu-
lating the recapture  of fugitive slaves, which  White  concedes one
could  infer  reasonably  from the  text,66  was  of  a  nature  making
it  exclusive  of  state  power,  the fact  that Pennsylvania's  statute
was  consistent  in  its  purposes  with,  and  did  not  obstruct  the
implementation  of, the  federal  Fugitive  Slave  Act  of  1793  was
simply  irrelevant:  the Constitution's  grant of power  to Congress
to  adopt  the  Fugitive  Slave  Act  necessarily  deprived  states  of
the power  to enact laws  regulating the  same  subject.
Third, and  perhaps most important, White  is correct  in saying
that  Story's language  fails  to acknowledge  that the Constitution
as  a whole  was  a  compromise  between  the South  and the North.
Yet, to say that the fugitive slave clause  was  a concession  to the
South  whereas  the  representation  formula  was  a  concession  to
the  North  seems  entirely  consistent  with  that  fact. 67  The  fact
62.  M'Culloch  v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4  Wheat.) 316,  407  (1819).
63.  Id.
64.  22  U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  1  (1824).
65.  Id.  at  209-10.
66.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3, at  120-21.
67.  Under  the representation  clause,  the  slave  population  of  the South  received  only
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that  the  document  as  a  whole  is  a  compromise  does  not  mean
that  every  provision  of  the  document  must  itself  embody  the
compromise.  In this  sense, the  Constitution  as  a whole  "accom-
modates  opposing  interests,"  even  if  the  fugitive  slave  clause
does  not.6
In  short, Story's  interpretation  of the  fugitive  slave  clause  is
a plausible  one.  What  about  White's  claim that  "Story's method
eliminates  the aspirational  or idealizing  element"  of law?69  Here
too White's  effort  to criticize  an  essentially  historical method  of
analysis by ignoring history leads him astray. Earlier in the book,
White identifies  a "principle  of the  separation  of powers" 7 0  that
requires  lawyers  to  do  more  than  assess  the  results  of  cases:
"The  question for the lawyer  is  always more than what the best
result or rule would be, for it includes  as well the question:  Who
should  have  the  power  to  decide  what  the  best  result  or  rule
is  . . . ?-71  A  similar  separation  of  powers  issue  underlies  the
problem in the slavery  cases. Conceding that the enterprise that
the  Constitution  put in place  has  an  idealizing  element, lawyers
like  Story  may  well  have  believed  that  the  idealizing  element
consisted  of  the  survival  of  the  United  States  as  an  ongoing
enterprise that achieves  the best results over the course of time,
even  if  quite  bad  results  might  be  in  place  at  any  particular
moment.  Story's  emphasis  on  the  concessions  to  the  South  is
consistent with this view of the Constitution as a whole. As Story
saw  it, and  he  seems  to  have  been  correct,  those  concessions
were  essential  to the  establishment  of the United  States, which
once in operation  could place the people of the Nation on a course
leading to the  eventual  elimination  of slavery.  Without the  con-
cessions, slavery would have been entrenched  permanently  in the
South  with  no  prospect  of  elimination  by  the  Nation  in  which
the  South  participated.  The  idealizing  element  was  the  Consti-
tution  as  a whole,  rather than  any particular  part  of it. If Story
believed that the Nation  could not survive without  acceptance  of
his interpretation  of the fugitive  slave clause,  and  if he believed
that the  survival  of the  Nation  provided  the  best  prospect  for
three-fifths  weight  in  determining the  number  of seats  to which  Southern states  were
entitled  in  the House  of Representatives.  The  three-fifths  clause  reduced  the  represen-
tation the South  would have had if slaves had  been counted  fully. See  U.S.  CONST.  art. 1,
5 2,  cl.  3.
68.  J.  WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 118-19.
69.  Id. at 121.
70.  Id. at  96.
71.  Id.
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the elimination  of slavery,  then his interpretation  of the fugitive
slave  clause  indeed  embodied  the  aspirational  element  of  the
law.
72
By beginning his analysis of judicial opinions  with an extended
discussion  of  slavery  and  then  following  with  criticisms  of  law-
and-order  criminal procedure  opinions,  White takes the easy way
out.  Both  areas  pose  more  difficult  questions  than  White  poses
for  his  readers,  even  in  the  aspirational  and  idealizing  mode.
Once again, White's openness to other voices  is more partial than
he  acknowledges.  The  ease with  which  White  makes  judgments
about  difficult  questions  is  characteristic  too of both his  attempt
to appropriate  a certain  kind  of philosophy  for  his views  and  of
his  criticisms  of economics  in law.
As I have suggested,  White  has  a rather old-fashioned  view  of
philosophy,  as  these  things  go.  For  him, philosophy  consists  of
efforts to develop  a "propositional  and conceptual  language" that
will  have the  "authority  . . . of naturalness." 73  This  language  is
"inherently aggressive: the idea is to stake out certain intellectual
terrain  with the force  of  one's logic,  or  by the demonstration  of
certain facts, against an audience  assumed to be hostile, who  will
be persuaded only if compelled." 4 In contrast, the "literary method
. . . proceeds  . . on  the  assumption  that  our  categories  and
terms  are  perpetually  losing  and  acquiring  meaning,  that they
mean  differently  [sic]  to  different  people  and  in  different  texts.
It  is  not  a territorial  claim  but an invitation  to reflection.7 5
What  is  puzzling,  though,  is that  White  claims  Ludwig  Witt-
genstein  for  the "literary method,"  taking "as  the text to which
72.  The  second  part of  the  chapter  on slavery  contains  an analysis  of Dred  Scott  v.
Sandford,  60  U.S.  (19  How.) 393  (1857),  in  which  White's criticisms  are  more  cogent.  He
notes that Chief Justice Taney's  opinion introduces  the question of race with  a "stunning
shock,"  given  that  the  Constitution  nowhere  uses  racial  terms. J. WHITE,  supra  note 3,
at  126-27.  Only  a jurisprudence  of original  intent  could  move  from  the  language  of  the
Constitution  to  the  language  of  race.  White  offers  an  acute  analysis  of  how  Taney's
reliance on race supported the unnecessary  conclusion that the Constitution used "citizen"
in a unitary way, so that if African-Americans  were citizens  for purposes  of the diversity
clause-the  issue  in  Dred Scott-they  were  necessarily  citizens  for  purposes  of  the
privileges  and  immunities  clause.  Id.  at  126-29.  This  conclusion,  which  followed  from
Taney's  unitary definition,  was politically  unacceptable  to the South  in  1857.  D.  FEHREN-
BACHER,  THE  DRED  SCOTT  CASE:  ITS  SIGNIFICANCE  IN  AMERICAN  LAW  AND  POLITICS  68
(1978).
73.  J. WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 22.
74.  Id. at 41.
75.  Id. at 41-42. I note the possibility that lawyers enjoy being the objects of aggression,
thus  making  the  conceptual  technique  that White  describes  a rhetorical  trope  sensitive
to the demands  of the  audience.
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[the  book]  is  addressed"  Wittgenstein's  famous  statement,  "To
imagine  a  language  means  to  imagine  a  form  of  life. '76  Today,
the lesson philosophers  learn from Wittgenstein  is the futility  of
attempting  to  provide  greater  clarity  for  a  language  than  that
language already  provides. They are not, in short, conceptualists
of the sort White  describes.  At the  same  time, however,  White
wants to recruit Wittgenstein  for  a reformist  project that would
invite  the  community  of  lawyers,  legal  scholars,  and  readers  of
his  book  to  open  themselves  to  "a  variety  of  languages  and
voices. '7 7  For White, in law "every speaker is particularly located,
both  rhetorically  and  socially. '78  Wittgenstein  understood  that
principle  as  well,  but  believed  that  he  could  not  proceed  from
there  to  any  reformist  conclusion,  that  the  goal  of  philosophy
was  to leave everything  just as  it  was.
With that understanding of Wittgenstein, the phrase  "[t]o imag-
ine  a  language  means  to  imagine  a  form  of  life"  takes  on  a
somewhat  different  meaning. 7 9 There  appear  to be two  possibili-
ties. 80  First, the language  of the law that White finds  so uncom-
fortable  is the  form  of life  that is  the law.  White  may  not  like
that  form  of  life,  but he  cannot  criticize  the  language  that  con-
stitutes  that form  of life,  that constitutes  the  law, for failing  to
respect the "aspirational  or idealizing element[s]"  that are  essen-
tial  to  "what  we  think  of  as  law."81  To  the  extent  that  the
language  that constitutes the law lacks  those  elements,  it  is not
a form of life that is aspirational  and  idealizing. On this view, as
much  as he  tries to present  himself  as  an insider  to law, White
actually  speaks  about  it  from  the  outside.  Alternatively,  White
76.  Id. at ix.
77.  Id. at xiv.  White notes  that he has tried  "to speak  mainly  to the  general  reader,"
id. at xviii,  though I would  not bet the store against  White's royalties.
78.  Id. at 96.
79.  Perhaps my objection to White's  attempt to appropriate Wittgenstein for his project
is  overly  sensitive,  though  I  find  White's  efforts  to  do  so  instructive.  He  seems  to  be
saying  to his readers,  "You  know  that Wittgenstein  is  a  major  figure  in the  culture  of
the twentieth  century; the fact, as I present it, that my  views are in some  ways attuned
to  his  gives  me  the  kind  of  credibility  that  invites  you  to  take  me  seriously."  This
approach  is  akin to relying  on a moral stance of  opposition to slavery to put the readers
on White's side; it avoids  all the  hard questions.  See supra text accompanying  notes  38-
46.
80. I would get into deeper water than is appropriate  in this Review if I sketched  how
some philosophers  believe they can indeed get from  Wittgenstein's premises  to reformist
conclusions.  I  note  only  that  the  task  is  a  difficult  one  and  that  White's  attempt  to
appropriate  Wittgenstein  for  his  own  purposes  completely  fails  to  acknowledge  the
difficulties.
81. J. WHITE, supra  note  3,  at  121.
1990]WILLIAM  AND MARY  LAW REVIEW
may truly be an insider. Then, however, his language  of aspiration
is  already  part  of  the  law,  just  as  the  language  of  concepts  is
part  of the law. If so, there is nothing to reform;  the form  of life
that  is  the  law  is  already  open  to  "a  variety  of  languages  and
voices,"  such  as  Posner's, Dworkin's,  White's, and  mine.
8 2
More  serious  are  the  defects  in  White's  criticisms  of  "the
language and culture of economics,"  the title of his third chapter.8
Perhaps  because  he does  not confront  real texts written by real
people,  White  constructs  a  series  of  straw  menu  to  criticize.
Undoubtedly, some people  do hold the views that White criticizes,
but  those  views  are  not  economics  as  a reified  entity, as  White
supposes;  they  are, instead,  a  particularly  ideologically  charged
version  of  economics.  Exploring  White's  criticisms  of economics
leads  me  to  offer  yet  another  element  of  the  idealized  reader
White  imagines  for  his book.
After  some  deliberation,  I concluded  that the  only  way  to lay
out White's  position  is to provide  a  catalogue  of the silly things
he  says  about  economics.  Following  this  catalogue,  I  address
briefly  some  of  his  more  specific  criticisms.  First,  White  says
that  economists  formally  define  the  "self-interest"  with  which
they are  concerned  as a technical term encompassing  everything
that  each  person  values. 5  When  economists  use  that  term  in  a
culture  "so  heavily  dominated  by  the  motive  of  self-interest  in
the usual sense, that of selfishness  or self-centeredness,"  however,
they  slide  inevitably  into  "validat[ing]  both  selfishness  and  the
desire  to  acquire  and  consume. '86  Certainly,  if  people  are  not
careful  about  using  technical  terms -particularly  if they  have  a
political  commitment  to selfishness  in  the  ordinary  sense-they
are  likely  to  elide  the  differences  between  their  technical  defi-
nitions  and  ordinary  usage.  I would  like  some  evidence,  though,
of the inevitability that White claims  exists, particularly because,
as White  knows, 7 every time someone  says this sort of thing to
a  careful  economist,  the  economist  gives  the  right answer,  that
the terms are  indeed  technical ones.
Second,  according  to  White,  economics  reduces  "all  the great
questions of life.  . . to acquisition, competition,  and calculation."'
82.  I am not unaware that  no women  or members of minority  racial groups  are  on  this
list.
83.  J.  WHITE,  supra note  3, at  46.
84.  I use  the gendered  version deliberately.
85.  J.  WHITE,  supra  note  3,  at 55.
86.  Id.
87.  See id.  at 53-54.
88.  Id.  at  59.
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Third,  White  objects  to  the  quasi-mathematical  character  of ec-
onomics  which,  to him, leads to consideration  of only  "binary  or
dichotomous  phenomena,"' 89  rather  than  "the  fact  that  in  our
actual  lives  all  human  beings  are  engaged in  a  never-completed
process  of growth and  change." 9 0  Economics,  according  to White,
divides the lifetime  into two periods:  an early one  of immaturity
and a later one during which fully competent people make choices.91
Is  it  churlish  to point  out  that Franco  Modigliani  won  a  Nobel
Memorial  Prize  in  economics  for  his  work  on  the  choices  that
people  make  over  their  lifetimes?  Further,  if  I  found  White's
description  of  the  intellectual  world  of  "us"  academic  lawyers
foreign,  what  will economists  think of this  silliness:
On the economic view,.  . .the individual is reduced to a single
unit, supposed  to know its  own values  and how best to pursue
them. This means, among other things, that education-for the
rest  of  us  the  process  by  which  character  and  value  are
formed-is  reduced  to  the  acquisition  of  information.  True
education  of  the  mind  and  self is  in  such  terms  completely
unimaginable;  so too is the conception  of the polity as a means
of collective  education.92
Against  these  images  of  economics,  White  sets  "the  law."  For
him,  "law  assumes  an  equality  of  actors  and  speakers,  not  of
dollars."93 An  economist  might  point  out,  however,  that  having
enough  dollars  to  hire  a  lawyer  does  not  hurt  someone  in  the
forums  of the law.
At  the  conclusion  of  the  chapter,  White  offers  a  number  of
more  specific  criticisms  of  economics,  again  in  the  straw  man
mode.  First, he states  that "economics  is blind  to the differences
in  wealth  among  different  actors  in  the  real  world. 9 4  White
acknowledges  that  many  economists  believe  that  these  differ-
ences  raise  questions  of distribution  as to which  they  have  "no
special  wisdom,' 95  but  argues  that  economists  should  ask  ques-
tions  about  distribution  as  "independent  mind[s]"  and  their  an-
swers  should  appear  in  their  work. 6  In  addition,  according  to
89.  Id.  at 64-65.
90.  Id.  at 65.
91.  Id.  at 64-65.
92.  Id.  at 65.
93.  Id.  at 79.
94.  Id. at 82.
95.  Id.
96.  Id.
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White, economists  do address questions  of distribution by assum-
ing that the  marginal  utility  of  money  is  constant. 9 7  The latter
point is certainly overstated. At least some economists  are willing
to entertain  the  assumption  that the  marginal  utility  of  money
declines  with  wealth,  and  after  making  that  assumption,  they
have  offered  analyses  of  policies  that say  something  about  how
governments  might  alter  the  distribution  of  Wealth  without  im-
pairing  the  incentives  with  which  they,  and  we,  are  also  con-
cerned.  White's first point, that economists  ought to think about
distribution  as  independent  minds,  is  surely  correct,  but  his
further point, that if they bracket concern about distribution they
"impliedly  assert"  the  "fairness"  of  the  existing  system, 9 8  is
simply  false.  Numerous  economists  have taken  positions  equiva-
lent  to:  "Well,  here's  how  things  look  when  you  work  out  the
implications  of the paradigm of acquisition and trading; isn't that
really  disgusting?"
Second,  White  says  that  "[the  market]  systematically  under-
values"  resources  that  "have  a  long  or  indefinite  life"  because
"for this kind of economics  all value is  ultimately  exchange value
and  hence,  in  our  world,  money  value  . . . and  because  the
exchange  method  generates  the  conception  of income  over  time
as the definition  of wealth."99 As a result, "this kind of economics
can  have  no way to measure  any 'resource'  that has a permanent
value."'1 00  If this premise  means  anything, and I am not sure that
it  does,  it  means  that  economists  sometimes  fail  to  set  the
discount rates for certain resources at a low enough value-even,
for  permanent  resources,  whatever  they  are,  at  zero.'0'  But,
Philistine  that I  am, I confess  to some  puzzlement  at the notion
of a permanent  resource.  White  has in  mind  "social  and cultural
resources," 1 0 2 but these must be of a special sort. Literary works,
for  example,  may  have  permanent  value,  but  setting an  appro-
priate discount rate for the physical material that embodies  them
is  not particularly  problematic;  the  degeneration  of paper  does
not  mean  the  loss  of Middlemarch.' 03  Physical  artifacts,  such  as
97.  Id.  at  82-83.
98.  Id.  at  82.
99.  Id.
100.  Id. at  83.
101.  A  discount  rate  of zero  means  that at  every  point  in  the future  the resource  is
worth exactly  what it is  worth at present;  a discount rate  of one, in contrast, means  that
as soon  as the  present  period  is over,  the resource  loses its  value  completely.
102.  J.  WHITE,  supra note 3,  at 84.
103.  G.  ELIOT,  MIDDLEMARCH  (1871-72).
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the  Venus  de  Milo or  the  Parthenon,  seem  better  suited  to
White's idea, yet I wonder about the "permanence"  of their value.
For whether  the  governments  of Greece  over the  next  century
ought  to  devote  so  many  resources  to  the  preservation  of  the
Parthenon  against physical deterioration  as to ensure the contin-
ued  impoverishment  of  a  large  segment  of  the  population  of
Greece seems a question worth discussion, rather than one whose
answer  is  as obvious  as  White suggests.1 04
Third,  White  says that  "economics  has the  greatest  difficulty
in  reflecting  the  reality  of  human  community  and  the  value  of
communal  institutions."'1 5 Here  too  he  concedes  that  he is  criti-
cizing  "the  tendency  of the  popularized  version  of  this  kind  of
economics,"  which  "in its  more sophisticated  forms  .. .seeks to
describe  and explain  cooperation  . . . in its familiar terms, those
of  individual  actors  pursuing  individual  interests.'016  As  to  so-
phisticated  versions,  however,  White  simply  asserts  that  econo-
mists  cannot  sustain a  way of talking that treats  altruism  "as  a
species  of selfishness.'' 0 7  This assertion  is not an  argument.
Fourth, White states that "the language of self and self-interest
not  only  fails  to  reflect  the  reality  of  community  and  shared
interests,  it  draws  attention  away  from  those  aspects  of life  as
well, and devalues them."' 0 8  His most forceful point is that adopt-
ing "the economic  view would in fact threaten the very existence
of  community,  for  on  these  premises  no  one  would  conceivably
die  or  risk  her  life  for  her  community:  at  the  point  of  danger,
one's self-interest  in survival would outweigh  all  other self inter-
ests."'0 9 White's view, in my opinion,  is as wrong as  one  can get.
There is nothing noneconomic  about the proposition that someone
who failed to sacrifice her life for her community would thereafter
be filled  with such self-loathing that her lifetime  utility would be
lower  than would  have been the case  had she  sacrificed  her life.
As I suggested  in the opening sentence  of this Review,  I am not
comfortable  talking about such  things in this way, but  no careful
economist,  and  such  people  do  exist,  would  say  that  his  or  her
104.  An  answer,  of course,  is that the resources necessary  to  preserve  the Parthenon
are  not  that  great,  or  that  the  collateral  benefits  of  preserving  the  Parthenon  will
generate,  in  the  long run,  enough  additional  resources  to  overcome  poverty  in Greece.
My  only  point is  that the answer  White  assumes  is correct  is not obviously  correct.
105.  J.  WHITE,  supra  note 3, at  84.
106.  Id.  at  84-85.
107.  Id.  at  85.
108.  Id.
109.  Id.
1990] 123WILLIAM  AND MARY  LAW  REVIEW
commitments  to economics inevitably lead to the conclusions that
White states  economics  must  yield.
Finally, White  offers  this statement:
[T]o  speak of all "tastes" as if they were equivalent is to invite
oneself and  others to  think that they  are,  and to  confirm  the
premise[  ] . . . that no  distinction  can be  drawn between  the
beautiful  and  ugly,  the  wise  and  foolish,  and  so  on.  It  is  to
confirm a vulgar view  of democracy that makes  the preference
or  will  supreme  ....  110
At this  point,  recalling  why  Bentham  said that pushpin  was  as
good  as poetry  is appropriate.  The  move was  indeed democratic,
but not vulgarly  democratic.  Economics  emerged  as  a theory  of
democracy  to challenge  aristocratic  elites who  claimed that what
they valued was more significant than what the peasantry valued.
White  objects  to economics  because  it fails  to  acknowledge  suf-
ficiently  the  values  that traditional  aristocracies  promoted.  An-
other aspect of the idealized reader White imagines as his audience
is thus the reader's  superiority to the vulgar  masses  who  do not
place  enough  value  on  "social  and  cultural  resources"  such  as
poems  and  White's  book.
White's  use  of the term  "quasi-mathematical,"  mentioned  ear-
lier,"'  suggests yet another dimension to White's discomfort with
economics.  White  the  humanist  is  simply  uncomfortable  with
science.  He  does  not  like  "attempts  to  apply  to  human  life  the
language and methods  of physical  science" 1 2 and is  unhappy with
"the purportedly higher status of science" as compared to literary
criticism."3  His  attitude  reflects  not  only  the  language  of  terri-
toriality, that scientific methods  have encroached  inappropriately
upon  the  humanist's  terrain,  but  also  the  language  of the  aris-
tocratic  humanist,  who stands  above  the scientists'  vulgar inter-
ference  with the physical  world.
In approaching my conclusion,  I want to reflect on some aspects
of the complex confrontation  of science  and the humanities. First,
remember  that  "Euclid  alone  has  looked  on  Beauty  bare."1
4
Second,  while  I  was  in  college  I took  a  course  called,  as best  I
can  recall, "Analysis of Functions  of a Real  Variable."  The  object
110.  Id.
111.  See supra note  89  and  accompanying text.
112.  J. WHITE,  supra  note  3, at 78.
113.  Id. at  98.
114.  Edna St. Vincent  Millay  (1920).
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of the  course  was  to construct  the system  of mathematics  from
arithmetic to calculus  and beyond  from an extremely  small  num-
ber  of  assumptions.  Although  I  lacked  the  ability  to  work  out
the  details  and  did  not  do  well  in  the  course,  I  had  enough
intuitive  appreciation  for  the  project  to find  it  incredibly  beau-
tiful."5  Third,  Rudy  Rucker,  a  writer  of  science  fiction,  has  a
story entitled  "A  New  Golden  Age."" 6 In the story, mathemati-
cians  build  a machine  that translates  mathematics  into music in
an effort to obtain greater  funding for their research. They listen
to the tapes of their elegant  proofs  and find them wonderful.  To
appease  an influential politician, they also  make a tape  of a book
by  a mathematical  crank, who  claims to  have trisected  an angle
and squared  a circle.  Then, they play the tapes for the politicians.
The politicians  find the mathematicians'  tapes "dreary,"  but they
love the tape of the crank's book: "So  many symbols," one says." 7
White  is  a  "so many  symbols"  person."8  I  find  it  difficult  to
imagine  him responding  as  I do  to Barnett  Newman's  awesome
"Stations  of  the  Cross."" 9  His  style  reminds  readers  of  nine-
teenth-century  novels; indeed,  he comes  close  to "Reader, I mar-
ried  him"' 2 0  at various points in  his book. In short, White  is not
all  that  open  to  science  or,  by  implication,  the  modern  world.
This  lack  of  openness  causes  some  difficulties  for  his  effort  to
perceive  a form of life by imagining  a language,  especially  when
that language  is  not in conformity  with  so much  of the  form  of
life in which  most of us  are situated.
Furthermore,  White's  lack  of  openness  causes  difficulties  for
what White  offers  as his primary  program. His aim is to encour-
age  "intellectual  integration,"  which  we  have  seen  to  be  an
115.  A  reasonably  accessible  introduction  to the  first  steps  in  the  construction  is  D.
KNUTH,  SURREAL  NUMBERS  (1974) (described by its author  as a mathematical  novelette).
116.  In  MATHENAUTS:  TALES  OF MATHEMATICAL  WONDER  54 (R. Rucker  ed.  1987).
117.  The  allusion  is  to  a  musical  anecdote  about  a  potential  patron  of  Mozart  who
commented  critically  about Mozart's  work,  "Too  many notes." The  point of the anecdote,
and  of Rucker's  variant  on  it,  is  that the  quantity  of  notes  is  not a relevant  basis  for
either criticism  or praise.
118.  Consider  the rhythm  of this  brief, representative  excerpt:  "I  am speaking,  then,
not  of  necessities  but of  tendencies,  of the  forces  a  particular  mode  of speaking  seems
to generate, the  directions it  moves us, or what might  be called its cultural  implications,
or the pressures  with which  our art must  come to terms." J.  WHITE,  supra note 3, at 27.
119.  This  work  is  a series  of  14  (or 15, depending  on  whether  one  counts  a  second
version of the "First Station")  paintings inadequately  described  as presenting  the viewer
with  one, two, or three vertical  stripes on very large  canvases;  the edges of the  stripes
vary  in their  sharpness.  For  a  more  complete  description  and  depiction,  see  T.  HESS,
BARNETT  NEWMAN (1971).
120.  C.  BRONTE,  JANE  EYRE  ch.  38 (1847).
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openness to diverse voices,  "put[ting] together in a complex whole
•  . . aspects  of  our  culture,  or  of  the  world,  that  seem  to  us
disparate  or  unconnected.' 121  Integration  to White  is "a  putting
together  of two things to make out of them a third, a new whole,
with a meaning  of its own."'122 White leaves  one  voice  out  of this
new  whole,  however:  the  voice  of  science  and  mathematics,  the
voice  of the economist.
White's  discomfort  with  science  identifies  the  final  aspect  of
his  imagined  reader:  the  nineteenth-century  romantic  humanist.
Being  a  romantic  or  a  humanist  is  not  wrong,  although  the
sensibilities  of such  a  person  can  occasionally  slip  a little. Thus,
in  discussing  economics,  White  writes,
It is a truism  for economists that "we"  are much  "richer" than
we  were  30  years  ago.  But  is  that  so  obviously  true  if  one
takes into account the value of safe streets, healthy food, clean
air  and  water,  unspoiled  scenery,  a  supportive  community,  or
a  sensible pace  of life?1"
Such  nostalgia  for  an imagined  past of harmony  is characteristi-
cally  romantic.  I refrain  from  making  a global  judgment, but,  in
1960,  no ban  on  atmospheric  testing  of nuclear  weapons  existed
and  strontium-90  was  in our milk; the pace  of life for  people  like
White  may  have  been  more  sensible,  but  the  absence  of public
financing  for the  ailments  of  old age  meant that poverty  among
the elderly was scandalously  high; some people lived in supportive
communities, but African-Americans  who ventured  onto the high-
ways  in the South  and  elsewhere  found  it  difficult  to find  clean
places to  eat or sleep.
In  sum,  true  intellectual  integration  means  being  open  to  a
range  of voices that White's  romantic  humanist  would  prefer  to
ignore: that of the honest police  officer attempting to do a difficult
job,  that  of  the  scientist  attempting  to  improve  the  quality  of
life  and  deepen  the  understanding  of  nature,  even  that  of  the
economist trying to figure  out the best way for society to accom-
plish  its  various  goals  in  a  world  with  limited  resources  and
justified  but conflicting  claims  on those  resources.
121.  J. WHITE,  supra note  3, at  3.
122.  Id. at  4.
123.  Id. at 71-72.  Notice that  White  uses scare  quotes  around  "we"  when  he  thinks it
valuable.
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